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From Wald to Savage:  
homo economicus becomes a Bayesian statistician 
 
Nicola Giocoli* 
Department of Economics, University of Pisa 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Rational behavior is the cornerstone of neoclassical economics. In the specific case of decisions 
under uncertainty, an agent can be termed rational if and only if she behaves as a Bayesian 
decision-maker, that is to say, if she makes choices according to the three main tenets of 
Bayesianism, namely, if she i) captures uncertainty by probability (whenever a fact is not known, 
the decision-maker should have probabilistic beliefs about it); ii) captures information by 
conditioning probabilities (the decision-maker should update her prior beliefs according to Bayes’s 
rule as new information arrives); iii) follows the expected utility rule (the chosen alternative should 
maximize the weighted average of probabilities and utilities). In short, in the neoclassical paradigm 
economic rationality coincides with Bayesian rationality, as embodied in standard game and 
decision theory.1 Yet, exactly how, when and why did the traditional notion of homo economicus 
as a self-interested utility maximizer came to be equated with the more sophisticated one of a 
Bayesian decision-maker?  
The answer is seemingly straightforward. Credit should be given to the theory of decision under 
uncertainty developed by Leonard J. Savage in his classic 1954 volume, The Foundations of 
Statistics (Savage 1954 [1972]; FS henceforth). In the book Savage successfully combined a 
personalistic notion of probability with Bayes’s rule and the axiomatic method to develop his 
                                                 
*
 Via Curtatone e Montanara 15, 56126, Pisa, Italy; giocoli@mail.jus.unipi.it. I thank for their useful comments and 
suggestions Marcello Basili, Marco Dardi, Gur Huberman, Philippe Mongin, Ivan Moscati, Carlo Zappia. I am also 
grateful to the organizer, Samuel Ferey, and the participants to the Symposium on “Decision theory in economics: 
between logic and psychology” held during CLMPS 2011 in Nancy (France). The financial support of MIUR PRIN 
“Mathematics in the history of economics” is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1
 Cf. Gilboa, Postlewaite & Schmeidler 2009, 287, “…within economic theory the Bayesian approach is the sole 
claimant to the throne of rationality”. On the three tenets, see Gilboa, Postlewaite & Schmeidler 2004, who also add, 
as a fourth principle, that “a state should resolve all uncertainty”, i.e., specify “all possibly relevant causal relationships 
and all that is known about the way information is obtained” (ibid., 5). 
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subjective expected utility theory (SEUT henceforth) which became the new orthodox 
characterization of economic rationality. Moreover, SEUT and Bayesianism played a key role in the 
late 1970s – early 1980s boom of game theory: in the hands of John Harsanyi and others, Savage’s 
decision theory became the logical underpinning of the new orthodoxy in the field, Bayesian game 
theory, so much so that the latter may be considered the former’s extension to a multi-agent 
setting (Myerson 1991, 5). Hence, both parametric and strategic rationality are nowadays founded 
upon Savage’s SEUT and share the three main tenets of Bayesianism. 
The “how, when and why” question may thus look like a no-brainer – a settled issue devoid of 
further historical interest.  Yet, historically speaking, the emergence of Bayesianism and SEUT as 
the characterization of economic rationality was hardly warranted, in view of Savage’s  1954 real 
goal – transforming traditional statistics into a behavioral discipline – and actual achievement – 
the proof that the transformation was impossible. The aim of the present paper is to tell the story 
of that goal and that achievement, i.e., of how a self-recognized fiasco eventually became an 
unintended triumph. Acknowledging this story turns the “how, when and why” question into a 
meaningful one as it reveals that the metamorphosis of the traditional homo economicus into a 
Bayesian decision maker was far from inevitable, if only because its origins lie in a botched 
scientific endeavor. Thus, though the paper does not provide an answer to the “how, when and 
why” of Bayesianism in economics,2 it will hopefully set the stage for viewing that question as a 
historically serious one. 
In his 1946 JPE review of the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Jacob Marschak focused, 
as many other commentators, on John von Neumann’s far-from-intuitive notion of mixed 
strategies and remarked that, by embodying that notion into his characterization of rational 
strategic behavior, von Neumann’s theory ended up requiring that “to be an economic man, one 
must be a statistical man”. However, in a footnote Marschak also noted that, in the same years, 
Abraham Wald was working at a new kind of statistical decision theory, according to which “being 
a statistical man implies being an economic man” (Marschak 1946, 109, text and fn.14). While von 
Neumann was requiring the homo economicus to make inferences like a proven statistician, Wald 
was suggesting that statisticians should embrace an economic way of reasoning. This passage in 
Marschak’s review aptly captures the gist of the present paper. As it turns out, Savage’s 1954 
project was to reinforce, by way of the axiomatic method, the Wald’s part of Marschak’s remark, 
i.e., to teach statisticians how to behave as rational economic agents, but eventually, and 
                                                 
2 A couple of tentative explanations will nonetheless be given in the last section. 
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unintendedly, ended up strengthening the von Neumann’s part, transforming the economic men 
populating neoclassical models into fully-fledged Bayesian statisticians.  
 
 
§1. The pioneer: Wald’s economic approach to statistics 
 
The name of Abraham Wald is associated with the rise of behavioral statistics on account of his 
work on statistical decision theory.3 His basic intuition was that statistical problems should be 
considered as special instances of general decision problems, where decisions have to be taken 
under conditions of uncertainty. Hence, from a decision-theoretic point of view, statistics should 
be defined as the science of making decisions in the face of uncertainty. A solution to a statistical 
problem must therefore instruct the statistician about what to do, i.e., what particular action to 
take, not just what to say. This approach was dubbed by Wald as inductive behavior, following the 
similar expression used by Jerzy Neyman in a 1938 paper (Neyman 1938).4 
Generally speaking, a statistical decision problem (SDP henceforth) arises when a set of 
alternative decisions exists and the statistician’s preference over them depends on an unknown 
probability distribution. The key insight relating this literature to modern economics is that the 
decision model developed by Wald  also provides a setup for analyzing individual behavior in 
mundane problems of everyday life.  The central issues in any SDP are, first, to choose what 
“experiment” to perform in order to extract information from the available data and, then, to 
choose what action to take (say, continuing experimentation or taking a final decision) given the 
experiment’s outcome.  
The basic decision model, for which credit must be given to Wald, is made of four components 
(see Ferguson 1976): i) the available actions; ii) the states of the world, one of which is the true, 
unknown one (so-called parameter space); iii) the loss function, measuring the loss to the 
statistician if he takes a certain action when the true state is a given one; iv) an experiment, whose 
                                                 
3 For Wald’s intellectual biography see Wolfowitz 1952 and Menger 1952. Leonard 2010 contains other information 
about Wald’s troubled life.  
4 As a matter of fact, the true inventor of the economic approach to statistics, including the notions of loss function 
and experimental cost, was William S. Gosset, aka “Student” (see Ziliak 2008; Ziliak & McKloskey 2008). Wald was 
seemingly unaware of “Student”’s approach, if not through the mediation of Egon Pearson and Jerzy Neyman who, 
themselves influenced by “Student”, had put forward similar ideas (see e.g. Neyman & Pearson 1933). It may be 
worthwhile to remember here that the most prominent statistician of the time, Ronald Fisher, and his disciples 
(including Harold Hotelling, who hired Wald as a statistician at Columbia University) fiercely opposed the decision-
theoretic approach to statistics (cf. Fisher 1955, 75: “…in inductive inference we introduce no cost functions for faulty 
judgments... […] We make no attempt to evaluate these consequences and do not assume that they are capable of 
evaluation…”).  
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goal is to help the statistician to reduce the loss and whose results (called observations) depend 
on the true state. A decision function is a rule associating an action to each possible experimental 
outcome. The available decision functions are evaluated according to the expected loss their 
adoption may cause under the various possible states. The statistician’s task is then to choose the 
decision function capable of minimizing, in some specified sense, the expected loss. 
Wald developed this setup in several works. The seminal one came in 1939 (Wald 1939) and 
already contained most of the main ideas, such as the definition of general decision problem and 
the notion of loss function. It also featured the two analytical principles which were to play a 
crucial role in the derivation of Wald’s theory, namely, the minimax principle and Bayes’s rule.5 In 
the paper, the solution of a SDP – what he calls “the determination of the region of acceptance” of 
a given hypothesis – is made to depend on two circumstances: first, that not all errors (i.e., taking 
a certain action, like accepting a given hypothesis, when the true, yet unknown, state is a given 
one) are equal, and, second, that the statistician may have an a priori probability distribution over 
the parameter space (Wald 1939, 301). The first circumstance is accounted for by introducing a 
weight function which expresses the relative importance of the possible errors. Wald emphasizes 
that the choice of the specific shape of the weight function is not a matter of either mathematics 
or statistics. Often the importance of errors may be expressed in monetary terms, so much so that 
the function measures the monetary loss of taking a certain action when a certain state is the true 
one.6 As to the second circumstance, Wald explicitly rejects Bayesianism as a philosophy of 
probability and mentions many objections which may be raised against the adoption of an a priori 
probability distribution. Solving a SDP must therefore be independent of the availability of an a 
priori distribution. Yet, the existence of such distribution is a very useful analytical tool:  “The 
reason we introduce here a hypothetical probability distribution of [states of the world] is simply 
that it proves to be useful in deducing certain theorems and in the calculation of the best system 
of regions of acceptance” (ibid., 302). What we see here is the first instance of Wald’s 
instrumental approach to Bayesianism, a recurring theme in his later works and a key point to 
understand the real goal of Savage’s 1954 project.  
Having defined the risk function as the expected loss of selecting a certain “region of 
acceptance”, Wald proposes the mimimax principle as a general solution for a SDP, i.e., as a rule to 
                                                 
5 Note that the paper came before von Neumann & Morgenstern’s 1944 Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
where the minimax principle is cornerstone, though, of course, after John von Neumann’s first proof of the minimax 
theorem (von Neumann 1928). When still in Europe, Wald was well acquainted with von Neumann’s works: see 
Leonard 2010, Ch.8. 
6 That was precisely “Student”’s approach and what the Fisher school explicitly rejected: see above, fn.4. 
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choose the region of acceptance under a given weight function. He argues that, whenever we 
decide not to take into consideration an a priori probability distribution over the parameter space, 
“it seems reasonable to choose that [region of acceptance] which for which [the maximum risk] 
becomes a minimum” (ibid., 305). Thus, as early as 1939, he advocates the minimax as a 
reasonable solution criterion. Both the minimax and Bayes’s rule are singled out for their 
expediency in deriving analytical results, but it is only for the minimax that Wald suggests that an 
explicit justification may be found for employing it as a practical SDP solution.   
In short, though several elements were still missing – above all the idea that the design of the 
experiment be also part of a SDP7 – the 1939 paper shows Wald’s awareness that his ideas might 
be used to build a unified general theory of statistics, as well as to solve explicit statistical 
problems. This awareness allowed Wald to make further steps in his program following two crucial 
external events. First, the publication in 1944 of the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
which suggested him the key insight of re-interpreting a SDP as a kind of von Neumann’s two-
person zero-sum games, and, second, his being presented with a specific instance of SDP in the 
form of quality control of warfare supplies.8 
The latter event took place in early 1943, when a US Navy Captain, Garret L. Schuyler 
complained with economist and statistician Allen Wallis about the excessive size of the sample 
required for comparing percentages in ordnance testing.9 As Wallis himself recounted many years 
later, Schuyler argued that, in the specific case of judging alternative methods of firing naval shells, 
“a wise and seasoned ordnance expert […] would see after the first few thousand, or even few 
hundred, [rounds] that the experiment need not be completed, either because the new method is 
obviously inferior or because it is obviously superior” (Wallis 1980, 325). Why, complained 
Schuyler, did statisticians go on designing “an experiment which is so long, which is so costly and 
which uses up so much of your shells that you’ve lost the war before you get the test over”? (see 
Warren Weaver’s personal remiscences, quoted by Klein 2000, 47). Why not take a “more 
economic” approach to testing warfare equipment, i.e., one which could at the same time 
minimize experiment costs and ensure adequate sampling for proper quality control? 
                                                 
7 The experiments in the 1939 paper are always single-stage. The breakthrough came with the analysis of multi-stage 
experiments, starting from Wald’s work on sequential testing. 
8 According to Ferguson 1976, the limitations of Wald 1939, first of all the modelling of the action space as not 
independent of the state space, were perhaps due to Wald’s willingness to encompass within his approach the 
standard methods of hypothesis testing and point/interval estimation. No surprise at that, given the mentoring role 
exercised on Wald’s early forays in mathematical statistics by Harold Hotelling, the American leader of the Fisher 
school (see Wolfowitz 1952, 2-3).  
9 The episode is detailed in Wallis 1980 and Klein 2000. 
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As we learn from the historical note in Wald 1945, Wallis, together with future Nobelist Milton 
Friedman, tried to answer Captain Schuyler’s challenge by conjecturing that there might exist a 
sequential test capable of controlling type I and type II errors10 as effectively as the ordinary most 
powerful tests, while requiring a smaller expected number of observations. “It was at this stage 
that the problem was called to the attention of the author of the present paper. […] In April 1943 
the author devised such a test, called the sequential probability ratio test.” (Wald 1945, 121).11 
 A sequential test is defined by Wald as any kind of statistical procedure which gives a specific 
rule for taking, at any stage of the experiment, one of the following three actions: either accept 
the hypothesis being tested, or reject it, or continue experimentation by making an additional 
observation (Wald 1945, 118). The crucial feature of a sequential test is therefore that the number 
of observations is not predetermined, but is itself a random variable, given that at any stage of the 
experiment the decision to terminate the process depends on the result of previous observations. 
This was a big change with respect to standard test procedures, which required a fixed number of 
trials to be specified in advance and thus could at most be considered special cases of sequential 
procedures. The latter greatly economized on the number of observations, thereby answering 
Captain Schuyler’s complaints. 
The analytical goal of sequential testing is to minimize the number of observations required to 
reach a decision about acceptance or rejection of a given hypothesis under the desired test power. 
In the 1945 paper Wald did not manage to build an optimal test, i.e., one minimizing both the 
expected values of the number of observations required when either the given statistical 
assumption or its negation is true. Yet, he provided a substitute for the optimal test, and the proxy 
was, once again, offered by the minimax logic. He claimed that, when no a priori knowledge exists 
of how frequently the given hypothesis or its negation are true in long run, “it is perhaps more 
reasonable to minimize the maximum of [expected number of observations]...” (ibid., 124). The 
main tool developed by Wald under this logic was the sequential probability ratio (SPR) test, a 
testing procedure based on an expected number of observations considerably smaller than in 
standard most powerful tests for any desired level of control of type I and type II errors. Crucially 
for our story, the SPR test was explicitly founded upon Bayes’s rule: it required updating any a 
priori probability the experimenter might entertain about the truthfulness of a given hypothesis 
                                                 
10 Recall that, in statistical jargon, by type I and type II errors it is meant the possibility of, respectively, falsely 
rejecting a true hypothesis and failing to reject a wrong one. 
11 Wald adds that “the National Defense Research Committee considered these developments sufficiently useful for 
the war effort to keep the results out of the reach of the enemy…”. Secrecy explains why the new method of 
sequential analysis was published in a scientific journal only two years later, in 1945. 
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with the new information arising from experimental observations. At any stage of the experiment 
the updating warranted that one of three actions be taken, namely, either accept or reject the 
hypothesis or continue with one more observation. Wald first argued that the SPR test might 
warrant any desired level of control over the two kinds of errors, while at the same time requiring 
much less information. Then, he explicitly distanced himself from endorsing Bayesianism and 
proved that the SPR test might work even in the absence of any a priori probability distribution.   
Thus, by 1943 Wald had devised a brand new approach to the testing of statistical assumptions. 
The approach was based on strict economic logic from both the viewpoint of economizing over the 
experiment’s costs and of asking the experimenter to act as an economic agent and take at each 
stage an optimal action, i.e., whether to endorse a certain hypothesis or to continue 
experimentation. In the latter respect, sequential testing was a direct application of the behavioral 
logic introduced in the 1939 paper – indeed, it proved the logic might bring operational results. 
Yet, the new procedure went beyond the seminal paper in that it got rid of the traditional single-
stage-experiment constraint, explicitly allowing for multi-stage experimentation, where the 
behavioral element was even more crucial. In the following years Wald pursued three different 
research lines: i) the construction of usable sequential testing procedures; ii) the solution of 
specific SDPs; iii) the development of a general theory of statistical decision. It is this third, and 
most important, branch which matters to us.    
The final ingredient in Wald’s statistical decision theory came with acknowledging the formal 
overlap between his SDP and von Neumann’s two-person zero-sum games (2PZSG). We know that 
in a SDP the experimenter wishes to minimize the risk function r(F,δ), i.e., the expected maximum 
loss that taking a certain decision δ might cause when the true distribution of the parameter space 
is F.  Risk depends on two variables, but the experimenter can choose only one of them, δ, but not 
the other, the true distribution F. This is chosen by Nature and the choice is unknown to the 
experimenter. Wald realized that the situation was very similar to a 2PZSG, with Nature playing 
the role of the experimenter’s opponent. Thus, in Wald 1945a we find the first formulation of a 
SDP as a “game against Nature”, an approach which will enjoy considerable popularity in the 
following years and will shape much of postwar decision theory.  
As in von Neumann’s games, the solution to the SDP-turned-2PZSG comes from the minimax 
logic: “Whereas the experimenter wishes to minimize the risk r(F,δ), we can hardly say that Nature 
wishes to maximize r(F,δ). Nevertheless, since Nature’s choice is unknown to the experimenter, it 
is perhaps not unreasonable for the experimenter to behave as if Nature wanted to maximize the 
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risk.” (Wald 1950, 27).12 In this framework, “a problem of statistical inference becomes identical 
with a zero sum two person game” (Wald 1945a, 279). Yet again, Wald’s commitment to minimax 
was not complete. What really mattered to him was that, even without endorsing their underlying 
logic,13 both the theory of 2PZSG and the minimax solution were crucial for the analytics of 
statistical decision theory. 
In a 1947 paper Wald provided the first complete and truly general formulation of a SDP. He 
also demonstrated the complete class theorem, the crucial result upon which most of his later 
theory is founded. Having defined a statistical decision function as a rule associating each 
sequence of observations with a decision to accept a given hypothesis about an unknown 
distribution (Wald 1947, 549), the theorem claims that the class of Bayesian decision functions – 
that is, of decision functions based upon the existence of an a priori probability over the unknown 
distribution and on the updating of that probability according to Bayes’s rule – is complete (ibid., 
552). This means that for any non-Bayesian decision function which can be used to solve a given 
SDP, there always exists a Bayesian decision function which, for all possible a priori distributions, is 
at least as effective at minimizing the risk function, i.e., for which the expected value of maximum 
loss is never larger. 
With all the necessary ingredients at hand, Wald was eventually able to present in a compact 
form the outcomes of his decade-long research in the 1950 volume, Statistical Decision Functions. 
The book states from the beginning the motivation behind the whole project, namely, setting 
statistical theory free of two restrictions which marred it “until about ten years ago” (Wald 1950, 
v).14 These were, first, that experimentation was assumed to be carried out in a single stage and, 
second, that decision problems were restricted to the two special cases of hypothesis testing and 
point/interval estimation. Wald boasts his theory free of both restrictions, as it allows for multi-
stage experiments and general multi-decision problems. Any instance of the latter is treated in his 
new approach as a problem of inductive behavior: this because a statistician’s choice of a specific 
decision function uniquely prescribes the procedure she must follow for carrying out her 
experiments and making a terminal decision (ibid., 10). Thus, the behavioral character of statistics 
                                                 
12 Cf. the similar passage in Wald 1945a, 279, where the statistician is assumed to be “in complete ignorance as to 
Nature’s choice”. 
13 On von Neumann’s minimax logic see Giocoli 2003, Ch.4; 2006.   
14 The book also contains a historical note where Wald reconstructs the thread leading to the new theory (ibid., 28-
31). Credit for the first intuition of the decision-making character of statistical testing procedures is once again given 
to Neyman & Pearson 1933 and Neyman 1938. 
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is at the core of Wald’s theory. The generalization allowed by the new, decision-theoretic – or, as 
Marschak would say, “economic”15 – approach is truly remarkable. 
The 1950 book is in many respect just an outgrowth of Wald’s previous papers, though it is said 
to contain “a considerable expansion and generalization of the ideas and results obtained in these 
papers.” (ibid., 31). To our aims, it is important to mention the very clear exposition of the basic 
ingredients of the general SDP and, above all, the way Wald presents the crucial issue of how the 
experimenter may judge the relative merit of any given decision function. Two elements need be 
evaluated in this respect: the experimenter’s relative degree of preference over the various 
possible decisions when the true state of the world is known and the cost of experimentation 
(ibid., 8). The loss suffered by making a given terminal decision d when F is the true distribution of 
the parameter space is captured by the weight function W(F,d):16 this function is always among 
the data of a SDP, but the big issue is in many cases how to attach values to it, i.e., how to 
measure losses. Experiment cost depends on the chance variable selected for observation, on the 
actual observed values and on the number of stages in which experiment has been carried out. 
The sum of the expected value of W(F,d) and the expected cost of experimentation gives the risk 
function r(F,δ), where δ is the specific decision function adopted by the experimenter. Hence, the 
merit of any given decision function for purposes of inductive behavior may be entirely evaluated 
on the basis of the risk associated with it (ibid., 12). The complete class theorem of Wald 1947 
then allows to conclude that, if an a priori distribution ξ exists and is known to the experimenter, a 
decision function for which the average risk – the average being calculated using Bayes’s updating 
rule − takes its minimum value may be regarded as an optimum solution. In fact, a DF δ0 which 
minimizes this average risk for all possible δ is called a Bayes solution relative to the a priori 
distribution ξ (ibid., 16).  
Once more, Wald explicitly distances himself from “real” Bayesianism, claiming that the a priori 
distribution ξ may often either not exist or be unknown to the experimenter.17 As an alternative, 
one may thus make recourse to the minimax solution: a decision function is a minimax solution of 
the SDP if it minimizes the maximum risk with respect to the distribution F. The author also points 
to the “intimate connection” between Bayes and minimax solutions: under fairly general 
conditions a minimax solution to a SDP is also a Bayes solution (ibid., 89 ff.). And while both the 
                                                 
15 Cf. Savage 1961 [1964], 177, where inductive behavior is defined as “the economic analysis of statistical problems”. 
16 W(F,d) = 0 thus means that d is the correct terminal decision when F is true.  
17 “To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, it may be pointed out that the notions of Bayes solutions and a priori 
distributions are used here merely as mathematical tools to express some results concerning complete classes of 
decision rules, and in no way is the actual existence of an a priori distribution in postulated here.” (Wald 1950a, 238). 
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Bayes and the minimax solution are again justified for their usefulness in deriving basic results 
about complete classes of decision functions, Wald does offer his customary, though timid, 
defense of the minimax, calling it “a reasonable solution of the decision problem” precisely for 
those cases where ξ does not exist or is unknown (ibid., 18).  
In a concise presentation of his new theory for the 1950 International Congress of 
Mathematicians, Wald concluded by saying that “While the general decision theory has been 
developed to a considerable extent and many results of great generality are available, explicit 
solutions have been worked out so far only in a relatively small number of special cases. The 
mathematical difficulties in obtaining explicit solutions, particularly in the sequential case, are still 
great, but it is hoped that future research will lessen these difficulties and explicit solutions will be 
worked out in a great variety of problems” (Wald 1950a, 242). The airplane crash which killed 
Abraham Wald and his wife in December 1950 brought an abrupt end to this research. It will be up 
to other scholars to continue it and to one of them to turn it towards an unexpected direction.  
 
 
§2. The legacy: Savage on Wald 
 
Savage’s statistical work began at the Columbia University’s wartime Statistical Research Group, 
where he joined a stellar team of economists and statisticians, which included, among others, 
Friedman, Wallis and Wald. The SRG had been the receiver of Captain Schuyler’s complaints and 
where Wald had developed his analysis of sequential testing.18 The impact of Wald’s new theory 
on the young statistician was considerable, as is demonstrated by a couple of papers that Savage 
co-authored while at the SRG.19 Yet his plan was more ambitious.  
At the 1949 meeting of the Econometric Society, two sessions were held under the common 
title “Statistical inference in decision making”. The sessions featured 5 papers related to Wald’s 
research, including one by Wald himself who chaired one of the sessions. Savage was among the 
other presenters, with a paper titled “The role of personal probability in statistics”. That work has 
never been published, but its Econometrica abstract shows that by that early date Savage had 
already identified the core of his 1954 book. The key idea was, so to speak, “let’s take Wald 
                                                 
18 On the history of the SRG see Wallis 1980 and Klein 2000. 
19 Both Arnold, Girschick & Savage 1947 and Friedman & Savage 1947 deal with the design of experiments. Note that 
the papers were published only after the war, once again due to secrecy constraints about the SRG’s activity. On the 
impact of Wald’s sequential analysis upon the SRG see Wallis 1980, 325-8. 
 11 
seriously”. That is, if statistics must really become a behavioral discipline, if statistical inference is a 
matter of decision theory, if statisticians must behave as rational economic men, then it is 
necessary to characterize more rigorously what rational behavior amounts to. Only a full theory of 
rational behavior under uncertainty will provide – as Wald’s project requires – the decision-
theoretic foundations for a general theory of behavioral statistics (cf. Savage 1949). 
Yet, in order to do so one has to go beyond “the tendency of modern statisticians to 
countenance no other than the frequency definition of probability”. According to Savage, the 
frequentist view is indeed responsible for “insurmountable obstacles” preventing the 
development of behavioral statistics – obstacles that even Wald’s minimax theory has been unable 
to overcome, but that “may be bypassed by introducing into statistical theory a probability 
concept, which seems to have been best expressed by Bruno de Finetti…”. The latter has argued 
that “plausible assumptions about the behavior of a ‘reasonable’ individual faced with 
uncertainty” imply that “he associates numbers with the [uncertain] events, which from the purely 
mathematical point of view are probabilities.” Moreover, these probabilities, which Savage calls 
“personal probabilities”, are “in principle measurable by experiments” on the individual and their 
interpretation offers a well-defined characterization of how the individual should act in the face of 
uncertainty “in view of the von Neumann – Morgenstern theory of utility”. Unfortunately, Savage 
notes,  de Finetti’s theory “compares unsatisfactorily with others (in particular Wald’s theory of 
minimum risk)” because it neither predicts nor demands that a crucial feature of modern 
statistical analysis, deliberate randomization, be undertaken by the decision-maker. Thus, “both 
Wald’s and de Finetti’s theories are incomplete descriptions of what statistical behavior is and 
should be”, so much so that “we may look forward to their unification into a single more 
satisfactory theory”.20 
As it turns out, all the essential ingredients of FS are already here: the rejection of frequentism, 
though, note well, not of frequentist-based statistical techniques; the praise of Wald’s minimax; 
the personalistic view of probability as the numerical evaluation of uncertainty entertained by a 
“reasonable” decision-maker; the idea that personal probabilities can be elicited observing the 
agent’s behavior under uncertainty; the idea that these probabilities fully characterize that 
behavior according to von Neumann’s expected utility; the explicit normative penchant of the 
analysis; above all, the intuition that combining Wald and de Finetti may represent the most 
promising path towards a general theory of statistics as “acting in the face of uncertainty”. Also 
                                                 
20 All quotes are from Savage 1949, emphasis added. 
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noteworthy is what is not in Savage’s 1949 sort-of-manifesto. No reference is made, in fact, to 
Bayesianism as a general philosophy of probability,21 nor to the idea of upturning consolidated 
statistical techniques. Even the goal of developing a general theory of decision-making under 
uncertainty, to be used as a guide to rational behavior beyond the boundaries of statistical work, is 
conspicuously absent. The continuity of Savage’s manifesto with respect to Wald’s work was 
therefore quite strong. As in Wald, he wanted to apply (what today we call) Bayesian techniques 
to provide traditional statistics with more solid decision-theoretic foundations. As in Wald, his aim 
was to offer a guide to statisticians in their daily work. Where he wished to improve upon Wald 
was in the characterization of what it actually meant for a statistician to behave rationally in the 
face of uncertainty.   
The continuity is felt even more strongly in Savage’s review of Wald 1950. The paper – which 
appeared in the Journal of the American Statistical Association only after Wald’s tragic death but 
had been written before it – had been commissioned as more than a simple review. The goal 
assigned to Savage by JASA Editor was to give an informal exposition of Wald’s new approach to 
statistics. This explains why, as Savage himself observes, “the paper is no longer exclusively a 
review” (Savage 1951, 55, fn.1). Indeed, it is made up of three distinct parts, each of which of 
great historical relevance: i) a presentation of the decision-theoretic approach to statistics; ii) an 
introduction to the state-act-consequence model as a method to characterize an agent’s decision 
under uncertainty; iii) a critical exposition, plus a possible defense, of Wald’s minimax rule. Much 
like the 1949 paper, what we have here is a kind of manifesto, or, more properly, a work-in-
progress report, of the FS theoretical edifice. 
The review begins with the remark that the traditional statistical problem is to draw inferences, 
i.e., to make assertions on the basis of incomplete information. A related problem is the design of 
experiments permitting the strongest inference for given expenditure. But Wald’s theory is about 
statistical action, not inference, i.e., about deciding what behavior to take under incomplete 
information. As prominent examples Savage mentions quality control and experiment design, but 
his main point is that “all problems of statistics, including those of inference, are problems of 
action” (ibid., 55). Thus, statistics must be reinterpreted as a discipline concerned with behavior, 
rather than assertions. As he will put it in FS, statistics is about what to do, rather than what to 
say: “The name ‘statistical decision’ reflects the idea that inductive inference is not always, if ever, 
                                                 
21 Indeed, as showed by Feinberg 2003, the term itself “Bayesianism” was hardly used before the 1950s. Even the 
term “frequentist” seems to have become popular only in the 1950s, following its use as a polemic target by (whom 
today we call) Bayesians.  
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concerned with what to believe in the face of inconclusive evidence, but that at least sometimes it 
is concerned with action to decide upon such circumstances.” (FS, 2).22 
Having affirmed the behavioral content of statistics, Savage endeavors to explain what “a course 
of action” or, more simply, “an act” actually is. The notion must be understood “in a flexible 
sense”, as even the whole design of a complicated statistical program may be regarded as a single 
act. More than that, “in a highly idealized sense”, even an agent’s entire existence may be thought 
as involving only one, single-act life decision, such as, say, “the decision to conduct himself 
according to some set of maxims envisaging all eventualities” (Savage 1951, 56). Of course, such 
an idealized view of an act “is manifestly far-fetched”, but he believes it may call attention to the 
appropriateness in the new approach of considering “very large decision problems as organic 
wholes.” (ibid.). This is a crucial passage in the paper and, possibly, in Savage’s overall intellectual 
project, as it is precisely at this stage that his analysis parts company with Wald’s.  
We know that the latter had already presented a generalized version of SDP. Yet, Wald’s SDPs 
were still expressed in the technical jargon of probability distributions, set theory and parameter 
spaces, with no concession to the reader in terms of simplified, possibly non-statistical examples. 
Having been assigned the task to offer a cut down exposition of Wald 1950, Savage elects to 
present the basic decision problem in a more straightforward way: “Acts have consequences for 
the actor, and these consequences depend on facts, not all of which are generally known to him. 
The unknown facts will often be referred to as states of the world” (ibid., 56). The rhetorical power 
of the state-act-consequence (SAC) language can hardly be downplayed. It brings the reader the 
message that SDPs are really just like any other kind of decision problems. This is reinforced by the 
first example chosen by Savage to illustrate the power of the new language (ibid., 56-7), namely, 
the problem of deciding… whether to carry an umbrella under uncertain weather conditions! 
Provided each consequence can be assigned “a numerical score such that higher scores are 
preferred to lower scores” (monetary income being of course the most intuitive way to measure 
these scores) and provided agents may assign probabilities to the various states, it is possible to 
calculate the expected value associated with an action. The decision-maker will then follow von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s utility theory and choose the action maximizing this expected value 
(ibid., 57-8). However, if the agent does not assign probabilities to states “this trivial solution does 
not apply and the problem is newer”. Indeed, the main theme of “modern, or un-Bayesian, 
                                                 
22 In 1954 Savage will call the standard approach to statistics the verbalistic outlook (FS, 159), to be contrasted with 
the new behavioralistic outlook. A few years later the latter will be re-christened as the economic-theoretic approach: 
Savage 1961 [1964], 177.   
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statistical theory”, as Savage calls it, has been precisely that of dealing with uncertainty when 
probability does not apply to unknown states of the world (ibid., 58).    
Reading the 1951 review, one may not escape a sense of discontinuity in Savage’s exposition. 
While the paper’s first page, dedicated to explaining the new behavioral approach to statistics, 
might have been written by Wald himself and is fully pertinent to the general SDP issue, the 
introduction of the SAC terminology and, even more, the umbrella example bring the reader away 
from the realm of statistics and into that of economics, i.e., into the world of the theory of 
decision under uncertainty. The jump is of course intentional, as Savage wished to promote an 
economic approach to statistics, i.e., to bring forward the view that statisticians should behave as 
rational economic men. The message is: if we can devise a rule to effectively solve the umbrella 
dilemma, the very same rule can be applied to any kind of decision problems, including 
complicated statistical ones, because they all are amenable to treatment according to the SAC 
formalism and because their solution always involves the selection of an act among a set of 
alternatives. 
Having defined the notions of dominant and mixed acts, Savage proceeds to state “the general 
rule by which the theory of statistical decision functions tentatively proposes to solve all decision 
problems” (ibid.), that is, Wald’s minimax rule. Again, the rhetorical device is remarkable. Wald’s 
minimax is presented as a way out from the stalemate caused by the unavailability of probability 
values to be attached to states, a stalemate – which in FS Savage will call “complete ignorance” – 
that is said to always affect statistical problems within the “modern, or un-Bayesian” approach. Let 
I(a,s) be the expected income if act a is chosen when the true state is s (both a and s belong to 
finite sets). Let loss L(a,s) be the difference between the most that can be earned by choosing any 
act when state s obtains and what is actually earned by choosing a when s obtains, that is to say, 
L(a,s) = maxa’ I(a’,s) – I (a,s). Thus, as in Wald, the loss measures “how inappropriate the action a is 
in the state s” (ibid., 59). Wald’s minimax principle then states: choose an action a such that the 
maximum loss which may be suffered for any possible state s is as small as possible, i.e., that 
minimizes the maximum loss. This principle, which Savage credits as being “the only rule of 
comparable generality proposed since Bayes’ was published in 1763”,23 is said to be “central to the 
theory of statistical decision functions, at least today” (ibid., added emphasis). The emphasized 
words elucidate Savage’s attitude with respect to Wald’s minimax. In the rest of the review he will, 
first, offer a possible argument to justify the minimax, then criticize the criterion and, finally, argue 
                                                 
23 Note that never in the review Savage mentions the circumstance that Wald also employed Bayes’s rule, if only as a 
technical device. 
 15 
that Wald’s book – on account of its reliance on so arguable a criterion – is just a preliminary step 
towards a more complete reconstruction of statistics on behavioral basis, an endeavor that, after 
Wald’s death, it will be up to Savage himself to accomplish. 
Savage’s defense of the minimax as a rule for making statistical decisions under uncertainty is 
ingenious. In a clear anticipation of FS’s SEUT, he argues that in the case of individual decisions, 
the criterion is not required because, following de Finetti’s personalistic view of probability, 
individuals are never in a situation of “complete ignorance”: a single agent can always rank the 
consequences of her actions because she always holds probabilistic beliefs about the states of the 
world. Yet, the minimax becomes indispensable whenever decisions must be taken by a group: “If, 
however, the actor is a group of individuals who must act in concert with a view to augmenting 
the income of the group, the situation is radically different, and the problems of statistics may 
often, if not always, be considered of this sort.” (ibid., 61, emphasis added).  The reason is 
intuitive: whose probability belief about the states of the world should be given priority in 
deciding what action to take? Absent any reason for privileging one belief over the others, 
adopting the minimax criterion as if no such beliefs exist sounds appealing, because it “means to 
act so that the greatest violence done to anyone’s opinion shall be as small as possible” (ibid., 62). 
Thus the minimax commends itself as “a principle of group action”, a compromise solution which 
may avoid causing undue losses to any of the group’s members. As the previously emphasized 
words clarify,  Savage believes that group action is ubiquitous in statistics – indeed, in the whole of 
science.24 Moreover, it is often the case that, “under the minimax rule the same amount will be 
given up by each member of the group”, again reinforcing the compromise character of the 
minimax choice. Finally, the minimax also offers a way out from another, potentially troublesome 
issue, namely, that of selecting who is entitled to be part of the decision-making group: under the 
minimax all “reasonable” opinions may be considered, without having to decide beforehand 
whose opinion is legitimate and whose is not (ibid.).25  
This strong defense of the minimax does not hinder Savage from criticizing Wald’s theory. The 
first motive of dissatisfaction is precisely Wald’s inability to offer a valid justification for the 
                                                 
24 “…one might idealize at least part of the activity of academic science in terms of decisions reached jointly by the 
whole group of people interested and competent in the science in question.” (ibid., 62). 
25 Although determining what qualifies as a “reasonable” opinion is still “a real difficulty of the theory” (ibid., 65). 
Savage highlights another plus of the minimax rule in case of group action. The fact that the addition of a new act to 
the list of available ones may lead to the selection of a different minimax choice even if the latter assigns zero 
probability to the newly available act has brought many to attack Wald’s principle as paradoxical – indeed, as a 
violation of the independence axiom. Yet, in case of group decisions, there is no paradox in admitting that the addition 
of a new act to the list may lead the group to achieve a different compromise which now takes into account the 
circumstance that some of the group’s members may actually prefer the newly available act (ibid., 64).  
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criterion, which to him was merely an analytic device. Moreover, Wald’s definition of the loss 
function is unsatisfactory and exposes the minimax to the easy critique of being an unjustifiably 
ultra-pessimistic rule. Indeed, Wald failed to distinguish his notion of loss L(a,s) from that of 
negative income − I(a,s). The two notions coincide only if zero is the maximum value of I(a,s), that 
is, if the most the decision-maker may earn by guessing the right state and selecting the right 
action is the absence of any loss. In such a case it is L(a,s) = − I(a,s), but this is truly ultra-
pessimistic and “no serious justification for it has ever been suggested”; actually, it may even bring 
to the absurd conclusion that, in some cases, no amount of experimentation will bring the agent 
to behave differently than as if he were under complete ignorance (ibid., 63). It is this potential 
irrelevance of observations for the agent’s choice which makes Wald’s negative-income version of 
the minimax rule untenable for statistics.26 
Savage concludes the review by saying that the 1950 book, a “difficult and irritating” one to 
read, is at best a sort of intermediate report of Wald’s research, albeit of “great scholarly value” 
and with “inestimable” possible influence on future statistics. Clearly, the project of instructing 
statisticians to behave as economic actors was still incomplete: the minimax rule was itself far 
from perfect and, above all, no results had been achieved about either the applicability of the rule 
to instances of concrete statistical problem or the possibility to encompass the traditional 
inference techniques under the minimax umbrella. Yet the review already offers the guidelines for 
Savage’s own attempt to fulfill Wald’s project – what in the next § will be called the FS’s game 
plan. A theoretical breakthrough will nonetheless still be needed to accomplish the task, namely, 
the replacement of Wald’s minimax with a new decision criterion which, in turn, will require a 
novel characterization of probability as subjective belief. 
 
 
§3. The strategy: FS’s game plan 
 
Savage’s project in FS followed Wald’s steps and aimed at re-founding statistics by transforming it 
into a fully-fledged behavioral theory. Yet, differently from Wald, the discipline’s new foundations 
were to lie in a subjectivist notion of probability (FS, 4-5). Any investigation of the 1954 book must 
                                                 
26 The distinction between loss and negative income in the general case where maxa’ I(a’,s) ≠ 0 will be emphasized in 
the FS, where the loss will be, though only half-heartedly, re-christened as the regret function (FS, 163-4) and where 
the point of the potential absurdity of Wald’s account of the rule will be made even more forcefully (ibid., 170-1). 
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therefore keep in mind these two facts, i.e., that Savage targeted statistics, not economics, and 
that the two key ingredients in his book were behaviorism and subjectivism. 
“The purpose of this book, and indeed of statistics generally, [is] to discuss the implications of 
reasoning for the making of decisions.” (FS, 6). These words are placed by Savage at the beginning 
of FS’s Ch.2 to illustrate the first essential ingredient of his analysis, namely, the reinterpretation 
of statistics as a discipline concerned with the making of decisions, rather than the statement of 
assertions. As he puts it, “[t]he name ‘statistical decision’ reflects the idea that inductive inference 
is not always, if ever, concerned with what to believe in the face of inconclusive evidence, but that 
at least sometimes it is concerned with action to decide upon such circumstances.” (FS, 2). The 
traditional verbalistic outlook of statistics, where statistical problems concern deciding what to 
say, need be replaced by Wald’s behavioralistic outlook, according to which the object of statistics 
is to recommend wise action in the face of uncertainty (FS, 159). 
The second key ingredient in FS is the subjectivist, or personalistic, view of probability. Following 
de Finetti’s pioneering work, probability is defined as an index of a person’s opinion about an 
event, i.e., a measure of “…the confidence that a particular individual has in the truth of a 
particular proposition…” (FS, 3). In this view, “…personal probability […] is […] the only probability 
concept essential to science and other activities that call upon probability.” (FS, 56). Savage 
acknowledges that the 20
th
-century boom of statistical research – carried on by what he calls the 
British-American school of statistics – had taken place entirely in the objectivist field. Yet the 
frequentist view suffers from a series of weaknesses. Some are well known (like the fact that 
objective probability applies only to the very special case of repetitive events or the circularity of 
the frequentist definition, which depends on the existence of infinite sequences of independent 
events whose definition requires in turn a notion of probability), but Savage adds a further 
critique, namely, that objective probability cannot be used as a measure of the trust to be put in a 
proposition: “…the existence of evidence for a proposition can never, on an objectivistic view, be 
expressed by saying that the proposition is true with a certain probability. […] if one must choose 
among several courses of action in the light of experimental evidence, it is not meaningful, in 
terms of objective probability, to compute which of these actions […] has the highest expected 
income.” (FS, 4). Hence, objective probability is unsuited as a basis for a truly behavioral approach 
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to statistical problems,27 although any effort to rebuild the whole of statistics cannot overlook the 
bulk of invaluable results produced by the British-American School.  
Savage’s general goal of re-founding statistics explains why the book is divided in two distinct 
parts. In the first (Chs 2-7), he develops a rigorous theory of rational behavior under uncertainty 
which provides the required normative benchmark for behavioral statisticians. In the second (Chs 
9-17), he endeavors to reinterpret the statistical methods of the British-American School according 
to the new decision theory in order to demonstrate that standard inference techniques can work 
even in a subjectivist/behaviorist framework. As can be read in the book’s general outline: “It will, 
I hope, be demonstrated thereby that the superficially incompatible systems of ideas associated 
on the one hand with a personalistic view of probability and on the other with the objectivistically 
inspired developments of the British-American School do in fact land each other mutual support 
and clarification” (FS, 5). Drop the “subjectivist” component and what you have in this second part 
of FS is once again Wald’s general project for a behavioral statistics.  
Only by keeping in mind this two-part program it is possible to disentangle the complex 
structure of the 1954 book, which otherwise may look messy or, to be generous, as though it had 
been written by two different, sometimes even opposed, authors.28 Indeed, the program may be 
best appreciated by bringing to light the logical sequence followed by Savage to implement it, 
what I call the FS’s “game plan”: first, develop subjective probability theory and the new theory of 
rational behavior (SEUT); second, present and defend Wald’s minimax rule; third, show that the 
minimax rule may also be given a subjectivist interpretation; fourth, apply the minimax rule to 
demonstrate that orthodox inference techniques may be translated into behaviorist terms; fifth, 
replace in the latter task the minimax rule with the new SEUT. At the end of this sequence, a brand 
new kind of statistics would emerge, the traditional verbalistic and frequentist approach having 
been transformed into a behavioral discipline governed by a rigorous subjective decision theory. A 
very ingenious game plan, but, alas, also an unsuccessful one.    
As we already know, the FS’s second part did not fulfill its goal, so much so that the book is 
universally praised only because of its first seven chapters, while the remaining ones are usually 
neglected as ill-founded. Savage himself recognized the failure. By 1961 he had already realized 
                                                 
27 Note that Savage acknowledges that all the three main approaches to probability (objective, subjective and logicist) 
accept the axiomatic, or measure-theoretic, notion developed by Kolmogorov in the 1930s, the differences only 
amounting to the extra-mathematical interpretation given to the same formal concept of probability measure. Yet, 
Savage, as de Finetti before him (cf. von Plato 1994, 276-8), refrains from using in FS the measure-theoretic notion of 
probability on account of the dubious axiomatic legitimacy of the key postulate of countable additivity (FS, 42-3). 
28 Just think of the crucial role played in the second part by Wald’s minimax rule, a criterion based upon an objectivist 
notion of probability: see below, §5. 
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that Wald’s project was a dead alley: “…the minimax theory of statistics is […] an acknowledged 
failure. […] …those of us who, twelve or thirteen years ago, hoped to find in this rule an almost 
universal answer to the dilemma posed by abstinence from Bayes’ theorem have had to accept 
disappointment.” (Savage 1961 [1964], 179).29 In the preface to the 1972 edition of the book, he 
was even more explicit and admitted that the promised subjectivist justification of the frequentist 
inferential devices had not been found – quite to the contrary, what he had proved in FS was that 
such a justification could not be found! Indeed, his late 1950s-early 1960s “Bayesian awakening” 
came, at least in part, because he recognized the theoretical fiasco of the FS’s second part. As he 
put it in 1972, “Freud alone could explain how [such a] rash and unfulfilled promise […] went 
unamended through so many revisions of the manuscript.” (FS, iv). 
Actually, it was not a matter of psychoanalysis, but rather of the author’s not-yet-mature 
awareness of the potential of the Bayesian approach. It is again Savage himself who tells us that in 
the early 1950s he was still “… too deeply in the grip of the frequentist tradition […] to do a 
thorough job” (Savage 1961 [1964], 183).30 At the time of writing FS Savage had just converted 
from his initial objectivist stance to the subjectivist creed,31 as is confirmed by the book’s goal to 
complete Wald’s program on the behaviorist foundations of orthodox statistical techniques. To 
this aim, subjectivism – both in terms of the use of personal probability and in terms of SEUT – was 
just a useful tool, not the outcome of any deep philosophical commitment. Indeed, it is even 
legitimate to ask whether Savage was a Bayesian in 1954. Of the three main tenets of Bayesianism 
– assess empirical claims via subjective probabilities; use Bayes’s rule to evaluate new evidence; 
make decisions according to the expected utility rule – he fully endorsed in FS just the last one. 
This is not to mean that he disregarded the first two, but to underline that the book is rid with the 
author’s doubts and critiques about them and includes features one would never expect in a 
“truly” Bayesian analysis, like the ample space dedicated to the analysis of vagueness in 
probability claims and to choice under complete ignorance (see below, §5).32  
The fact is that Savage 1954 aimed neither at revolutionizing statistics, nor at describing how 
agents (let alone, economic agents) really behave. As to the latter, his new decision theory was 
                                                 
29 The reference to “twelve or thirteen years ago” is probably to Savage 1949.  
30 Remember once again that in the postwar years the Fisher School dominated US statistics, mainly through the 
overwhelming influence of Harold Hotelling. 
31 “The book shows him in a transition period. He had accepted the personalistic view of probability but had not 
abandoned minimax or other ideas of the frequentist school.” (Lindley 1980, 7). 
32 Also note that while the first two tenets are accepted under every possible definition of Bayesianism, it is more 
debatable that reliance on the expected utility rule should deserve the same status. As it happens, the inclusion of EU 
as the third fundamental tenet of Bayesianism is often justified on pragmatic grounds, while it might well be rejected 
at a non-pragmatic level of analysis: see Mongin 2011.    
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explicitly normative: the goal was to teach statisticians how they should behave to solve their 
statistical problems, not to describe how they – or any other decision-maker – actually behave. As 
to the former, we should not be deceived by the book’s foundational emphasis. Yes, Savage 
wanted to rebuild statistics on behavioral foundations, but this was hardly a novel project 
(actually, it was Wald’s one) and its most immediate implications were, to Savage, far from 
revolutionary. He openly admired and wanted to preserve orthodox inferential techniques – 
actually, he tried to strengthen them by providing the logical and behavioral underpinnings which 
they lacked in their standard frequentist rendition. Bayesian revolution, in both statistics and 
economics, was conspicuously absent from Savage’s 1954 radar. 33 As his disciple and co-author 
Dennis Lindley observed, in FS Savage was an unconscious revolutionary, so much so that the 
paradigm change (in Kuhnian sense) the book brought to statistics was, at least initially, an 
unintended one (Lindley 1980, 5-7). Yet, a revolutionary he was, and he was soon to recognize it: 
suffices to compare the timid, hands-off tone with which he presented personal probability in 
1954 with the self-confident, almost arrogant way he used time and again the expression “we 
Bayesians” (when not “we radical Bayesians”) in the 1961 paper.34 
 
 
§4. The achievement: FS’s SEUT 
 
Savage’s place in the history of science is unquestionably due to the axiomatic development of 
subjective expected utility theory (SEUT) in the first seven chapters of FS. In the crucial Chapter 5 
he demonstrates what in decision-theoretic jargon is called a representation theorem, that is, a 
theorem showing that, given an evaluation criterion for determining a preference relation over a 
set of options and given a set of axioms that the decision-maker’s preferences satisfy, the 
preferences about the options determined according to the evaluation criterion always coincide 
with the decision-maker’s preferences.35 In the case of Savage’s SEUT, where the options are acts, 
the evaluation criterion is the expected utility formula and the axioms are those listed in FS’s 
Chapters 2 and 3, the theorem shows that there exist a unique utility function and a unique 
                                                 
33 This is confirmed by Savage himself: “Savage (1954) […] was not written in the anticipation of radical changes in 
statistical practice. The idea was, rather, that subjective probability would lead to a better justification of statistics as 
it was then taught and practiced, without having any urgent practical consequences.” (Savage 1962, 9). 
34 Savage has claimed that his definitive conversion to Bayesianism was due to the likelihood principle: “I came to take 
Bayesian statistics seriously only through recognition of the likelihood principle” (Savage 1962). 
35 For a survey on representation theorems see Gilboa 2009, Chs. 9-15, and Wakker 2010, Part I. 
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subjective probability function such that the decision-maker’s preferences always conform with – 
i.e., are captured by – the expected utility formula. This means that an agent prefers act f over act 
g if and only if the expected utility associated with act f and calculated using those unique utility 
and probability functions is no less than that associated with act g (cf. FS, 79, Theorem 1). A 
rational agent, that is, an agent whose preferences satisfy Savage’s axioms, makes her decisions 
according to the expected utility formula. The latter is therefore the criterion for rational decision-
making under uncertainty. 
There are three distinguishing features in Savage’s SEUT: subjectivism, consistency and 
behaviorism. First of all, SEUT incorporates a personalistic view of probability, where uncertainty 
about the states of the world is captured in terms of probabilistic beliefs over those states. 
Second, the theory embodies a consistency view of rationality: the subjective beliefs are not 
entirely free, but need be constrained by a set of consistency requirements (the axioms). Third, 
SEUT partakes of the behaviorist methodology, as the unknown beliefs are elicited by observing 
the agent’s behavior in the face of simple choices under uncertainty (more on this below).  
Savage did not develop his theory in a vacuum. He availed himself of the foundations provided 
by von Neumann’s EUT and explicitly targeted the latter’s main weakness, namely, the not-so-
well-specified nature of the probability values. In the Theory of Games the derivation of numerical 
utilities had been based on the “…perfectly well founded interpretation of probability as frequency 
in long runs.” (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944 [1953], 19), but the authors themselves had left 
the door open to a subjectivist restatement (ibid., fn.2). That opportunity was seized by Savage: “A 
primary and elegant feature of Savage’s theory is that no concept of objective probability is 
assumed; rather a subjective probability measure arises as a consequence of his axioms” (Luce & 
Raiffa 1957, 304). Hence, the first feature of SEUT, the subjectivist approach to probability, finds a 
rationale in the author’s willingness to improve upon von Neumann’s theory.  
As to the notion of probability itself, Savage defined it as “the confidence that a particular 
individual has in the truth of a particular proposition” (FS, 3) and exploited de Finetti’s 
characterization of subjective beliefs as purely formal objects, constrained by consistency 
requirements and elicited by observing the decision-maker’s behavior under uncertainty (see de 
Finetti 1937 [1964]). This established a strong connection between the subjectivist side of SEUT 
and the other two main components, i.e., axiom-based consistency and behaviorism. It is indeed 
the latter’s combination which give analytical content to the former. 
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The second feature of SEUT, axiom-based consistency, warrants the theory’s desired 
normativeness (don’t forget that Savage’s main goal was to instruct statisticians about how to 
behave rationally). Inconsistent beliefs are those which violate the axioms and thus entail 
irrationality. Conversely, an agent may label herself rational if and only if her beliefs, as well as her 
preferences, obey the axioms. The role of Bayes’s rule is to police the consistency of beliefs by 
allowing their updating as long as new information arrives. 
The characterization of rationality as consistency was the trademark of postwar decision theory, 
which in turn represented the culmination of an almost century-long endeavor undertaken by 
marginalist and neoclassical economists who wished to model rational behavior. While the 
economists’ efforts had focused on the notion of utility, SEUT extended the consistency 
requirement to another kind of unobservable entities – the decision-maker’s beliefs about “the 
truth of a particular proposition”. Just like Gerard Debreu did for the agent’s preferences (Debreu 
1959) and Paul Samuelson for the agent’s choices (Samuelson 1948), Savage transformed those 
beliefs into tightly-constrained theoretical objects, suitable for formal modeling.36 This was a 
major innovation with respect to the previous literature on expectations and conjectures, where – 
with the only exception of non-economists de Finetti and Frank Ramsey – economists had treated 
agents’ beliefs as loose introspective entities, implicitly delegating their analysis to less rigorous 
disciplines, such as psychology or sociology.  
Note that Savage’s theory contains two elements which seemingly evoke introspection, namely, 
the property of cardinality of the EU function and, obviously, the subjective character of 
probability. Thus, it might seem natural to interpret SEUT, and the whole Bayesian program, as a 
step back towards a “metaphysical” view of rationality, imbued with unobservable mental 
variables and a naïve psychologism.37 Yet, nothing could be farther from Savage’s project. His goal 
was to obtain a characterization of rational behavior devoid of any psychological contamination by 
extending logic “to bear more fully on uncertainty” (FS, 6) – the kind of logic he referred to being 
the axiomatic one. It is indeed by focusing on the key property of consistency that the 
misunderstanding can be avoided. As we know, SEUT’s main claim is that if agents’ preferences 
and beliefs are consistent – in the sense specified by the axioms – then these preferences may 
represented by the expected utility formula. The axioms’ role is, therefore, mainly normative, that 
                                                 
36 On the history of choice and decision theory, see Giocoli 2003, 2005 and, for a more technical reconstruction, 
Moscati 2007. Note that Debreu (1959, 102, fn.1) explicitly acknowledged Savage’s influence.  
37 This reaction was quite common at that time: see e.g. Howard Raiffa’s recollection of the harsh critiques he 
received for his conversion to Bayesianism (Fienberg 2008, 141). 
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is, “to police my own decisions for consistency and, where possible, to make complicated 
decisions depend on simpler ones.” (FS, 20). Axioms, and more generally logic itself, should be 
viewed as “…a set of criteria by which to detect, with sufficient trouble, any inconsistencies there 
may be among our beliefs and to derive from the beliefs we already hold such new ones as 
consistency demands.” (ibid.). Far from being a retreat to old-style introspection or psychologism, 
Savage’s theory is first and foremost a normative guide to the formation of consistent beliefs: a 
rational agent – better, a rational statistician – is defined as someone who checks whether her 
beliefs satisfy the axioms and, in the negative case, revises them according to Bayes’s rule.38 
The requirement of consistency is also the yardstick to evaluate the admission to the axioms’ 
list. Here Savage followed again de Finetti to argue that only those properties whose violation 
entails an inconsistency should be legitimately listed as postulates (FS, 43). This is another 
noteworthy statement in view of the economists’ subsequent adoption of SEUT as a description of 
agents’ behavior. Take for instance Savage’s first postulate, P1, namely, that the preference 
relation be complete and transitive (preference as a simple ordering among acts). Economists 
before and after FS would oscillate between a descriptive and a prescriptive interpretation of the 
postulate, but Savage was much more clear-cut: P1 is simply a normative rule of consistency (FS, 
18-19). Viewing that axiom as a prediction of how real agents evaluate their market alternatives is, 
to say the least, to betray its original purpose of a rule to be obeyed by rational statisticians.39 
The third main feature of SEUT is behaviorism. Savage had a technical problem to solve: how to 
make the decision-maker’s probabilistic beliefs operational? In other words, how to “extract” 
these beliefs from the agent’s mind and plug them into an empirically verifiable choice criterion,  
without making recourse to unacceptable introspection? His answer is in the observable notion of 
choice: it is choice which reveals the agent’s preference for one alternative over another and it is 
still choice which reveals the agent’s belief on the different probability of two events. 
Introspection is explicitly rejected as an “…especially objectionable [solution], because I think it of 
great importance that preference, and indifference, between [two events] be determined, at least 
in principle, by decisions between acts and not by response to introspective questions.” (FS, 17). 
Yet, even with respect to behaviorism, Savage’s 1954 views were hardly extreme. Once again, one 
                                                 
38 Cf. de Finetti 1937 [1964], 103: “It is precisely [the] condition of coherence which constitutes the sole principle 
from which one can deduce the whole calculus of probability…”. 
39 The pre-condition of what may legitimately count as a postulate also explains why the famous sure-thing principle, 
at least in its basic formulation – if an agent would not prefer act f to act g either knowing that event B obtained or 
knowing that event not-B obtained, then he does not prefer f to g (FS, 21) – was not included in Savage’s axioms’ list, 
but only left as a loose principle: “The sure-thing principle cannot appropriately be accepted as a postulate in the 
sense that P1 is…” (FS, 22). 
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gets the impression that his commitment to this aspect of SEUT was motivated more by a 
technical necessity than by a methodological endorsement.40 
That choice occupy a central position in Savage’s analysis is confirmed by his discussion in 
Chapter 3 of the possible methods through which beliefs may be elicited. The first method is that 
of simply asking the agent which of two events he considers more probable. Not surprisingly, 
Savage rejects it with the same argument used against introspection: “[W]hat could such 
interrogation have to do with the behavior of a person in the face of uncertainty, except of course 
for his verbal behavior under interrogation? If the state of mind in question is not capable of 
manifesting itself in some sort of extraverbal behavior, it is extraneous to our main interest.” (FS, 
27–8). The second method is called “behavioral interrogation”, i.e., the observation of the agent’s 
actual choices under uncertainty. It might surprise the reader to learn Savage was skeptical about 
this approach as well, but a moment’s reflection reveals that the reasons for his skepticism – the 
method’s cost in terms of time, money and effort and the practical impossibility to identify any 
two really identical choice situations (see FS, 29)  – are pretty understandable given the theory’s 
elected field of application, the solution of statistical decision problems. Savage’s preference 
explicitly then went to a third, intermediate method, “a compromise between economy and 
rigor”, which he considered “just the right one”, at least in the normative interpretation of his 
theory (FS, 28). The method entails a kind of intellectual experiment, and consists of, first, 
questioning the agent not about her generic feelings concerning the probability of two events, but 
about how she would behave in a very specific choice situation, and, second, using the answer to 
draw inferences about her probabilistic beliefs. As remarked by Karni & Mongin (2000, 246-7), 
with his intermediate method Savage was drawing the line between unacceptable purely 
epistemic statements, on the one side, and acceptable choice statements, on the other. An agent’s 
answers, provided they are expressed as choices among alternatives, constitute admissible 
evidence to elicit probabilistic beliefs in his theory. 
Regardless of the specific method employed, the general procedure by which probabilities are 
elicited in FS resembles Samuelson’s technique in revealed preference theory (Samuelson 1948; 
Wong 1978). Those subjective probability numbers that did not feature among the initial data do 
emerge from extending von Neumann’s EU theorem to the preferences held over a properly 
constructed probabilistic space. With his new representation theorem Savage proves that any 
choice made under conditions of uncertainty can be represented in terms of the EU rule and, in 
                                                 
40 This differs from his commitment to behaviorism in statistics which, as we know, was very strong. 
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particular, as if the agent’s decision is guided by the attribution to the states of the world of a well-
defined (i.e., numerical) subjective probability. Thus, we may speak of “revealed” subjective 
probabilities, though this should not be taken to imply that they emerge from a collection of real 
choice data, rather than from the answers to a merely intellectual experiment.  
Still in Chapter 5 Savage applies his theorem to classes of acts of increasing generality (FS, 76 
ff.). In its most general version the result is extended to bounded acts, i.e., acts whose utilities are 
bounded random variables. Adding that the axioms allow the replacement of consequences with 
utility numbers, so much so that any act f may be re-interpreted as a real-valued random variable 
of the kind featuring in statistical problems, Savage’s SEUT may be summarized as follows: given 
an event B and two bounded acts f and g, f is not preferred to g if and only if, under event B, the 
expected utility of f is less than that of g (FS, 82). This is the version of the representation theorem 
which is employed in the rest of FS as the cornerstone for the new foundations of statistics. 
 
 
§5. The challenge: FS’s second part 
 
Armed with the brilliant results of Chapter 5, Savage begins the following chapter declaring that: 
“With the construction of [SEUT] the theory of decision in the face of uncertainty is, in a sense, 
complete.” (FS, 105). The time was ripe, then, to tackle his real target, statistical decision problems 
(SDPs). Thanks to Wald, postwar statistics already conceived of the latter in terms of the general 
structure described above, §1. Take for instance Kenneth Arrow’s 1951 Econometrica survey, 
where the typical SDP is described à la Wald as follows: first, it is known that one out of a number 
of different hypotheses about a given situation is true; second, one out of a number of different 
experiments, or observations, must be performed in order to obtain an outcome that may be 
interpreted as a random variable whose probability distribution depends on which of the 
hypotheses is correct; third, on the basis of that outcome, an action has to be selected (Arrow 
1951, 409-10). Thus, the difference among the various approaches to statistical decision theory 
hinged upon the alternative ways to process the additional knowledge, if any at all,  which could 
be obtained via experiments or observations. Remarkably, in the second part of his book Savage 
stuck to Wald’s solution to this issue, despite its being founded upon an objectivistic view of 
probability. Indeed, one of the key passages in FS’s game plan was precisely that of reconciling 
Wald’s objectivist minimax rule with Savage’s subjectivist view of probability (see above, §3). The 
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reconciliation was essential in view of the desired re-interpretation in subjectivist and behaviorist 
terms of orthodox inference techniques. This explains why Savage spent so much effort to achieve 
it, albeit with meager results.  
Technically speaking, the bridge between the two approaches is granted by the notion of 
partition problem.41 When expressed in objectivist terms, a partition problem is a special kind of 
decision problem where the consequence of each act depends on which of several possible 
probability distributions applies to an observed random variable. Here again Savage follows Wald 
in arguing that such a setup is so pervasive in statistics that “…no other type of problem is 
systematically treated in modern statistics.” (FS, 120). In subjectivist terms, a partition problem is 
composed by i) a set of possible acts, ii) an unobservable random variable whose values uniquely 
characterize the consequences of each act (i.e., each realization of the random variable allows 
replacing the act with one of its consequences), and, iii) an observation, whose outcome affects 
the subjective probability attributed to the realizations of the random variable, so much so that 
the expected utility of each act is modified by the availability of the observation (ibid.). The crucial 
insight is that, since the unknown states of the world may well play the role of the random 
variable, any basic SDP42 may be reformulated as a partition problem.  
The reconciliation between Savage’s and Wald’s approaches comes in the opening remarks of 
Chapter 8, that is, at the very beginning of FS’s second part.43 There the author identifies the two 
worst drawbacks of existing decision theory – and thus the two main obstacles preventing the full 
development of behavioral statistics – as, respectively, the inevitable vagueness of the decision-
maker’s beliefs and the absence of a solution to multi-person decision problems with 
heterogeneous agents. It is exactly here that we find the key passage introducing the reader to the 
second part of Savage’s project: “From the personalistic point of view, statistics proper can 
perhaps be defined as the art of dealing with vagueness and interpersonal difference in decision 
situations.” (FS, 154). Surprisingly enough, Savage claims that the solution to both issues lies in the 
application of Wald’s minimax rule.  
Savage had already dealt with vagueness in Chapter 4, when discussing the traditional 
objections against subjective probability. The standard critique is that an agent’s beliefs may 
                                                 
41 The use of partitions to represent information had been known in economics and statistics since at least von 
Neumann’s exposition in the Theory of Games (see von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944 [1953], 60-73). 
42 What Savage calls observation problems, i.e., problems where the statistician makes an observation and then 
selects her act according to the outcome (FS, 105). These are a reduced version of general SDPs, which also include, as 
in Wald, the decision about what observations to make. 
43 The chapter’s title is, not casually, “Statistics Proper” (FS, 154). 
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hardly be assigned a precise quantitative value and that such vagueness is even more serious in 
the case of a normative theory, like that in FS, because it makes virtually impossible to formulate 
specific behavioral prescriptions (FS, 59). To counter the critique, Savage offers a fervent defense 
of… Wald’s objectivist minimax rule! To start with, he underlines that the key ingredients of his 
theory of subjective probability – i.e., the notions of states, events, acts and consequences – apply 
as well to Wald’s theory, “from which they were in fact derived” (FS, 158). The dividing line 
between the two approaches is the postulate that the decision-maker’s preferences establish a 
simple ordering among all acts. This is an assumption that no frequentist could accept because, 
when combined with neutral (in terms of probabilistic views) consistency requirements, it would 
entail, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, the existence of a subjective probability distribution.  
Three years after the publication of FS, Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa surveyed the different 
approaches to decision theory in Chapter 13 of their highly influential Games and Decisions. The 
survey lists the alternatives available in a period when SEUT was still far from dominant. Not 
surprisingly, Luce & Raiffa rank Savage’s approach as intermediate between the two extreme cases 
of risk and complete ignorance. The former refers to situations, like those in von Neumann’s EUT, 
where a probability distribution over the set of states of nature is either known or taken by the 
decision-maker as if it were known. The latter refers to cases where the decision-maker has no 
information about the states of the world (Luce & Raiffa 1957, 277-8). Between the two extremes, 
Luce & Raiffa identify the vast territory of decision making under partial ignorance, i.e., when an 
agent holds the subjective feeling that a state be more plausible than another. Here the decision-
maker is assumed to possess at least some vague information about the true state of the world, 
the real point being how such vague information can be processed (ibid., 299). It is in this territory 
that Luce & Raiffa place SEUT. 
Keeping in mind Luce & Raiffa’s classification, we can better understand Savage’s reconciliation 
of his own theory with Wald’s one. He argues that “…in practice the theory of personal probability 
is supposed to be an idealization of one’s own standards of behavior; [and] that the idealization is 
often imperfect in such a way that an aura of vagueness is attached to many judgments of 
personal probability…” (FS, 169, emphasis added). Thus, the minimax criterion may be invoked as 
a rule of thumb to be applied whenever the notion of “best choice” is “impractical” – impractical 
for the frequentist statistician because it would require the use of subjective probabilities; 
impractical for the subjectivist statistician in case of an overwhelming vagueness (FS, 206). 
Conversely, every time a coherent notion of “best choice” can be pursued – that is, every time a 
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simple ordering among all available acts may be established – the statistician should follow the 
consistency axioms and therefore apply SEUT. In short, Savage defends the minimax as a 
pragmatic rule which may step in whenever we face a failure of SEUT’s tight requirements – so 
tight, indeed, that Savage had to invent the (highly debatable) notion of small worlds to warrant 
them a sort of “protected reserve” (see FS, 9 and 82 ff.).  
It goes without saying that the reason mentioned by Savage for the “impracticality” of SEUT, 
namely, the vagueness of beliefs, would be almost anathema to “real”, die-hard Bayesians. 
Savage’s acknowledgment of a complete ignorance environment, and thus of the pragmatic 
validity of the minimax solution, actually goes even further. He admits that, in many instances, “I 
do not feel I know my own mind well enough to act definitely on the idea that the expected loss 
for [act] g really is L; but […] of course, feel perfectly confident that [act] f cannot result in a loss 
greater than [minimax value] L*” (FS, 169). Given that almost all SDPs allow for the possibility of a 
(relatively) inexpensive observation, and given that it may always exist an act conditional on such 
observation and capable of warranting a (relatively) small maximum loss L*, it turns out that the 
minimax criterion represents a desirable solution in every SDP where the statistician is unable to 
confidently select the SEU-maximizing act (ibid.). Thus, far from being incompatible with, or 
alternative to, SEUT, Wald’s minimax looks like a welcome complement to Savage’s approach to 
tackle those cases where vagueness prevails. This conclusion is, as we already know, a crucial step 
in FS’s game plan.  
The second drawback of existing decision theory, SEUT included, is the inability to solve multi-
person decision problems with heterogeneous agents (MPPs henceforth). Confirming his 1951 
views, Savage repeats that statistics has to do first and foremost with the behavior of groups, 
rather than with isolated decision-makers: “Multipersonal considerations constitute much of the 
essence of what is ordinarily called statistics.” (FS, 154; also see FS, 105). Two kinds of MPPs need 
be distinguished: those arising out of differences in tastes and those arising out of differences in 
judgment (FS, 155-6). The former can well be tackled by SEUT, which explicitly allows for 
heterogeneous preferences, but the latter cannot since agents diverge in their subjective 
probability assessments. The MPPs issue is thus a very serious one. Savage observes that 
statisticians of the objectivist school have begged it, on account of their denial of any role for 
personal judgments. Even subjectivists have coped with this difficulty only by self-limiting their 
analysis, i.e., by postulating that statistics be “largely devoted to exploiting similarities in the 
judgments of certain classes of people and in seeking devices, notably relevant observation, that 
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tend to minimize their differences.” (FS, 156). Why then did Savage put so much emphasis on such 
an intractable – and seemingly lateral – issue?  
The first obvious answer is that, within a truly behaviorist approach, statistics must deal with all 
kinds of probabilistic judgments as essential ingredients of action, regardless of their possible 
heterogeneity. Secondly, the emphasis on MPPs may be viewed as another outgrowth of Savage’s 
normative perspective, more specifically of his desire to offer a recipe for rational behavior valid 
for a group of statisticians, be they a team of experimenters facing a given observation problem or 
the members of a scientific community summoned to sanction a published result. Finally, but 
crucially, MPPs have a role to play in FS’s game plan, namely, that of allowing the desired 
reinterpretation of the main results of the British-American school of statistics in subjectivist terms 
(see above, §3). Savage acknowledges the standard view that subjective probability may at best 
apply to individual decision-making, but never to MPPs. The scientific method itself is said to rely 
exclusively on objective notions, the only ones which may effectively be shared inter-personally. It 
follows that “[t]he theory of probability relevant to science […] ought to be a codification of 
universally acceptable criteria”, so much so that no room is left for “personal difference” in 
probability judgments (FS, 67). As a counter-argument, Savage claims that “the personalistic view 
incorporates all the universally acceptable criteria for reasonableness in judgment”, although 
these criteria “do not guarantee agreement on all questions among all honest and freely 
communicating people” (ibid.). The key insight to uphold this claim is his reinterpretation of a 
partition problem as a MPP where agents, who differ in their a priori probability distribution on a 
random variable, share the same set of acts and the same a posteriori (i.e., post-observation) 
distribution (FS, 122). This reinterpretation provides the basis to demonstrate what is allegedly the 
most important result of the entire second part of FS, namely, that, having properly defined a 
subjectivist variant of MPP, we may solve it by invoking once again Wald’s minimax rule. 
In Chapter 10 Savage offers a model of group decision (FS, 172 ff.). Take a group of agents, 
indexed by j. Assume they share the same utility function, but differ in their personal beliefs. It is 
this difference – explicitly denied by the British-American approach – which captures the 
subjectivist element of the analysis. The group is called to choose, by acting in concert, an act f out 
of a set F of alternatives. Such a setup – epitomized by the functioning of a jury, but actually 
“…widespread in science and industry” (FS, 173) – defines a group decision problem (GDP). Savage 
recognizes that while no decision rule may have general validity for every GDP under all 
 30 
circumstances,44 rules of thumb do exist which may lead the group to reach an acceptable 
compromise. Indeed, the possibility of using mixed acts – one of the main tools in Wald’s box – can 
be given a natural interpretation in a GDP as a way to avoid the impasse and achieve the required 
compromise (ibid.). Although the members may differ in their personal judgments, there are 
plenty of instruments, such as coins, dice, cards, allowing the group to “objectively” mix, in any 
desired proportion, the individually preferred acts. Hence, it may well be assumed that the set F of 
available alternatives in any GDP always contains all the possible mixtures of its primary elements. 
This in turn allows a straightforward application of Wald’s criterion, in the novel form a group 
minimax rule (FS, 174). The rule states that, as a compromise solution, the group should adopt the 
act such that the largest personal loss faced by any member of the group is as small as possible. 
That is, the act f ’ should be chosen such that, for any agent j,  maxj L(f ’; j) = L* = minf maxj L(f ; j).45 
As we know, the notion of minimax as an “acceptable compromise” was already in Savage 1951 
(see above, §2). Yet, it cannot be expected that the group minimax rule will or should be accepted 
by every member of the group. As in the standard, single-agent case, what may be said is just that, 
if the minimax loss L* is small, the group may find it reasonable to follow the rule and select act f ’ 
because none of its members should consider this choice unacceptable nor could suggest any 
alternative capable of limiting every member’s loss to, at most, L*. Moreover, as he also noted in 
the 1951 review, a symmetry argument may be invoked, whereby in case of symmetric GDP the 
minimax rule would impose exactly the same loss L* on every member: an element of fairness 
which, according to Savage, would further augment the rule’s appeal in GDPs (ibid.). In short, far 
from being intractable, multi-person statistical problems, explicitly formulated in behaviorist terms 
and explicitly allowing for the heterogeneity of the members’ subjective beliefs, may find a 
pragmatic solution in the minimax criterion. The appeal to Wald’s pioneering contribution allows 
Savage to also get rid of the second major drawback of behavioral statistics.  
 
 
§6. The fiasco: FS’s abrupt ending 
 
The continuity between the second part of FS and Savage’s review of Wald 1950 should by now be 
apparent. This reinforces our point that the 1954 endeavor was no more, and no less, than 
                                                 
44 Nowhere in FS Savage mentions Arrow’s social choice theory or the search for “best” voting procedures. 
45 The formula is identical with the usual minimax rule, but its elements now have a different meaning. Also recall that 
the idea of the minimax as an “acceptable compromise” was already in Savage 1951: see above, §2. 
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Savage’s try at completing Wald’s project, with the only, though crucial, addition of the SEUT 
theorem. The continuity is confirmed by Savage’s critical attitude towards the minimax rule, and 
even more towards its “group” version – again a feature that went almost unchanged from the 
1951 paper to the 1954 book. Yet, within the theoretical edifice of FS, the importance of the group 
minimax rule does not hinge upon its practical acceptability as a decision-making criterion to be 
used in real MPPs. What the rule brings home for him is the desired synthesis between the 
subjectivist view of probability – here captured by the members’ differences in their beliefs about 
events – and Wald’s behaviorist approach – here epitomized by the asserted ubiquity of, explicitly 
behavioral, GDPs and MPPs in modern statistics. Hence, the achievement of FS’s Chapter 10, weak 
and debatable as it may be, is pivotal in Savage’s game plan. 
The rest of the book validates my assertion. The final chapters contain Savage’s attempt to 
reinterpret the three most important inference techniques – respectively, point estimation 
(Ch.15), the testing of hypothesis (Ch.16) and interval estimation (Ch.17) – in behavioral terms46 by 
applying Wald’s objectivist minimax rule. Granted such a reinterpretation, the FS’s game plan 
would then require to reformulate it in subjectivist terms, exploiting the newly established group 
minimax rule. Finally, for those special decision problems where vagueness is not a problem, the 
minimax rule would be replaced by the SEU rule, i.e., by the criterion allowing statisticians to 
select not just an “acceptable compromise” solution, but the “best” solution. This would 
accomplish the game plan.  
Unfortunately, Savage’s ingenious strategy ended in a fiasco. While he partially succeeded in 
giving a behavioral reinterpretation of point estimation (see FS, 229 ff.),47 doing the same for 
interval estimation proved impossible. In a behaviorist framework, the statistician’s problem is to 
make her “best” choice of an unknown parameter. Yet, following the orthodox doctrine of 
“accuracy estimation”, which only allows to know how “good” such a “best” choice is with respect 
to an interval of values, is of no avail for such a problem and  “…could at most satisfy [the 
statistician’s] idle curiosity…” (FS, 257-8). In other words, when the decision-maker is called to 
choose an act, i.e., to produce a point estimate, interval estimation is simply nonsensical. Thus, 
regardless of the fact that “most leaders in statistical theory have a long-standing enthusiasm for 
                                                 
46 As we know, this reinterpretation had been tried by Wald himself (see above, §1). The topic was a hot one in 1950s 
decision theory, the peculiarity of Savage’s attempt being its subjectivist foundation. For a compact statement of the 
whole issue, see Luce & Raiffa 1957, 309-24. 
47 The trick being that of reinterpreting point estimation as a decision problem to be solved via Wald’s minimax rule, 
assigning a zero loss to correct estimates. 
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[interval estimation]”, the technique may at most be used as a rough and informal device, while its 
usefulness for statistical decision-making is nil (FS, 260-1).  
The impossibility to offer a behaviorist reinterpretation of so crucial a tool as interval estimation 
was a fatal blow to Savage’s project of reconstructing mainstream statistics in behavioral and 
subjectivist terms. The simple truth emerging from his analysis was that behaviorism, subjectivism 
and orthodox inference techniques could not be reconciled. The collapse of FS’s game plan is 
testified by the somehow abrupt conclusion of the book, which features no concluding remarks, 
no summary of the main results, no recapitulation of the analytical trajectory followed thus far. It 
really looks like the author had suddenly realized that his entire program was doomed and thus 
decided to quit the work. As we know, in the preface to the second edition Savage invoked Freud 
to explain how the book’s project managed to survive in the face of such a dire conclusion (FS, iv). 
Fortunately, it took him only little time to react against the rout and become the most ardent 
supporter of a wholly new approach to statistics.  
In a 1961 re-assessment of his book Savage looks already aware of the revolution FS helped to 
trigger and wholeheartedly praises it.48 Far from orthodox methods, inference is defined by 
Bayesians as “changes in opinion induced by evidence on the application of Bayes’s theorem” 
(Savage 1961 [1964], 178). The frequentist approach is chastised as being more subjective than the 
personalistic one on account of the unconstrained nature of experiment design (ibid.). As an 
attempt to get rid of this subjective element of traditional statistics, Wald’s minimax criterion is 
deemed a failure – this despite “the strongest apology for the rule” given in FS (ibid., 179). The 
point is that subjectiveness is an unavoidable element of statistical analysis. By omitting empty 
questions about what “nice properties” a certain statistical procedure should have, but rather 
asking the decision-maker to choose between alternative procedures subject to strict consistency 
conditions (ibid., 179-80), the Bayesian approach ends up being more objective – i.e., more 
scientific – than the frequentist one, in that it imposes greater order on the subjective element of 
statistical decision-making (ibid., 181).  
What did Savage retain of his old game plan? The answer lies in his remark that: “One of the 
most valuable outgrowths of the frequentist movement is the behavioralistic (or one might say 
economic-theoretic) approach to statistical problems” (ibid., 177, emphasis added). Jerzy Neyman 
and, above all, Abraham Wald deserve credit for having launched the “economic analysis of 
statistical problems”, what they called “inductive behavior”. Thus, the truly valuable part of Wald’s 
                                                 
48 Note that, while the term “Bayesian” never featured in FS, at the turn of the 1960s its use in statistical jargon had 
already become commonplace. See Feinberg 2003, 16-17.  
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project – and, as a consequence, also of Savage’s own one which aimed at fulfilling it – is its 
behaviorist and decision-theoretic character, first and foremost its conception of the statistician as 
an economic man. Under this respect, FS was indeed successful, in that it crowned Wald’s efforts 
by developing a theory for decision-making under uncertainty which could be prescribed as a 
rational criterion for statistical problems. Yes, the other (possibly, the main) part of Wald’s project, 
and of FS as well, namely, the reconciliation of inductive behavior with orthodox inference via the 
minimax rule, was a failure. But, no, FS had not been written in vain, as it contained a new, 
powerful tool, SEUT, for rebuilding statistics as a wholly behavioral discipline. In this sense, Wald’s 
project had been accomplished, though by 1961 that rebuilding was still far from complete. The 
1954 book might be said to have honored its title, by laying solid foundations of statistics – though 
not of the statistics Wald and the early Savage were thinking of, but of a brand new kind of it.  
 
 
§7. The puzzle: why in economics? 
 
An instance of unintended consequences, the spread of Bayesian statistics helped popularize 
Savage’s SEUT. In itself, the theory did represent a remarkable achievement, and a source of 
perennial glory for its author. By his masterful use of the axiomatic method, Savage elegantly 
succeeded to fulfill the economists’ almost century-old pursuit of a general criterion for rational 
decision-making. Yet, a big historiographic puzzle remains: how could SEUT so quickly and so 
wholeheartedly be endorsed by neoclassical economists? How to explain its success in economics?  
To understand that a puzzle it is, consider what we have learned so far. First, Savage’s book was 
not addressed to economists, but to statisticians. Second, the book’s overall project was a 
remarkable fiasco as it ended up demonstrating exactly the opposite of what it was intended to. 
Third, FS’s most significant contribution, SEUT, was an explicitly normative theory aimed at guiding 
the statisticians’ work, not a positive one describing how real economic agents behave. Two 
further circumstances should be taken into account. On the one hand, Bayesian statistics, while 
spreading after the FS at a considerable pace in a small number of academic strongholds,49 was, 
and still is, a minority approach. As a matter of fact, most of the discipline has kept using 
traditional inference methods, though recognizing their foundational weaknesses, while 
                                                 
49 For an overview of the early years of Bayesianism in terms of academic success, see Feinberg 2003. 
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Bayesianism itself has been constantly and severely criticized ever since.50 Hence, Savage’s 
revolution was, at most, only a partial success. In no sense any part of it could be considered 
mainstream by the time neoclassical economics embraced SEUT. On the other hand, SEUT itself 
was hardly the only available option in mid-1950s decision theory: as the list of criteria in Chapter 
13 of the influential Luce & Raiffa 1957 makes clear, several alternatives did exist. Some had been 
even devised with the specific goal of encompassing situations of complete ignorance (i.e., 
Savage’s vagueness) as a way out from one of most vexed issues of theoretical economics (viz., 
Knightian or Keynesian uncertainty). Moreover, all these criteria commended themselves as lying 
upon rigorous axiomatic foundations – indeed, following Chernoff 1954, Luce & Raiffa’s goal in 
their 1957 survey had precisely been that of offering a general axiomatic characterization of all 
available decision rules, including those working under complete ignorance.51  
In view of all these circumstances, I reiterate the claim that explaining the postwar triumph of 
SEUT in neoclassical economics really is a historiographic puzzle. To reword Marschak’s 1946 
dictum, why “to be an economic agent implies being a Bayesian statistician”? How, when and why 
did the agents populating economic models come to be modeled as rigorous followers of Savage’s 
rationality prescriptions? As I said in the Introduction, I have no proper answer to this question. 
The paper’s goal was, as announced, just that of showing that the question itself is an interesting 
one for the history of postwar microeconomics. Yet, a couple of conjectures, whose consistency 
awaits further validation, may be offered here as concluding remarks.  
 
 
§8. The conjectures: consistency and business schools 
 
My first tentative explanation hinges upon a history of economic analysis argument. The 
catchword is “consistency”, that is to say, the circumstance that, as I have showed at length 
elsewhere,52 the history of the 20th-century neoclassical notion of rational behavior may be told in 
terms of the progressive replacement of the traditional maximization approach, where rationality 
consisted of the reasoned pursuit of one’s own self interest, in favor of the consistency approach, 
                                                 
50 The literature is huge. The controversy about Savage and Bayesianism started immediately (Kadane 2001, 5). For a 
modern rendition and rebuttal of the critiques, see Gelman 2008 (paper and discussion), and, on more philosophical 
grounds, Gelman & Shalizi 2011. For a detailed critique of SEUT, also see Shafer 1986 and the enclosed discussion.  
51 Note that, as a testimony to FS’s achievement, Luce & Raiffa adopted Savage’s state-act-consequence setup in their 
analysis. For an assessment of Luce & Raiffa’s survey vis-a-vis Savage’s contribution, see Giocoli 2005a. 
52 See Giocoli 2003; 2005.  
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where rationality means the satisfaction of a formal requirement of consistency and where the 
notion of agency becomes an all-purpose concept, valid for real individuals as well as for groups or 
machines. The process of distilling the formal essence of the notion of rationality in order to make 
it as general and rigorous as possible found its milestones in the works of authors such as Paul 
Samuelson, John von Neumann, Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu, and culminated in Savage’s 
SEUT.53 Thus, we might say that accepting to portray the homo economicus as a Bayesian 
statistician was just the inevitable, and almost “automatic”, conclusion of an intellectual journey 
neoclassical economists had begun long before.   
Modern historiography has showed that many top-notch theoretical economists working in the 
postwar era had been happy to embrace a new standard of representation of subjective variables 
in economic models based upon a (variable) combination of axiomatic and behavioral methods. At 
the turn of the 1960s, the standard had already been successfully applied to the modeling of the 
agents’ preferences and, therefore, of their choices under conditions of either certainty or risk. 
What remained to be done was to apply the same standard to the other source of subjectivism in 
economic behavior, namely, the agent’s beliefs, which mattered in case of choice under 
uncertainty. From this point of view, Savage’s SEUT was just the right theory at the right time. It 
may be thus surmised that what made it so attractive for postwar economists was the 
demonstration that even the agent’s beliefs could be subjected to tight rationality (viz., 
consistency) constraints, so much so that they could satisfy the new rigorous standard of 
theorizing and thus become proper ingredients of formalized economic models. In short, SEUT 
enabled neoclassical microeconomics to boast “mission accomplished”, at least as far as 
parametric rationality was concerned.54   
My second explanation is based on a wholly different argument, involving institutional and 
sociological factors. The catchword is “business schools”, that is to say, the conjecture that 
economists came to appreciate Bayesian decision theory via their increasing involvement in major 
MBA programs, where the new approach was explicitly taught.   
In a recent paper, Marion Fourcade and Rakesh Khurana have reconstructed the 20
th
-century 
evolution of teaching in US business schools, from their being dominated by mere practitioners 
devoid of any academic legitimacy to their becoming the largest employers of disciplinary trained 
                                                 
53 Anscombe & Aumann 1963 might also be included to the list. 
54 Even with respect to strategic rationality, it may be argued that the popularity of the Bayesian approach was 
instrumental, via the work of Reinhard Selten, John Harsanyi and Robert Aumann, in pushing economists towards 
Nash’s non-cooperative approach after its substantial neglect in the 1950s and 1960s: see Giocoli 2005; 2009.   
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social scientists. The new era for business schools began after WWII, when the rise of modern 
management science met the demand for a more scientific kind of managerial capabilities 
originating from the postwar conception of corporate “command and control” stemming from the 
war economy experience. In the new conception, “managers were increasingly described as 
‘systems designers’, ‘information processors’, and ‘programmers’ involved in regulating the 
interfaces between the organization and its environment and bringing rational analysis to bear on 
a firm’s problems” (Fourcade & Khurana 2011, 18). What Fourcade & Khurana call the 
“scientization” of business disciplines was triggered by a small group of scholars and academic 
officers who, working in newly established programs like Carnegie’s Graduate School of Industrial 
Administration (GSIA), managed to transplant into business teaching the decision-making 
techniques they had crafted doing operations research on behalf of the military during the war, 
thus paving the way to the new “scientific approach” to the managing of US corporations (ibid., 5).  
The GSIA did represent a radical departure from existing practices. Business education was seen 
at Carnegie “as an extension of the social sciences, rooted in quantitative analysis and the 
behavioral disciplines.” (ibid., 15). With the help of few funding patrons, chief among them the 
Ford Foundation, the landscape of US business schools underwent in a few years a major 
transformation, with a whole generation of economists, statisticians and other social scientists, all 
with formal PhD training and serious research interests, replacing the old instructors who 
frequently lacked academic credentials. Thus, “MBA courses were to be taught by disciplinary 
trained scholars steeped in the latest quantitative methods to study various phenomena of 
business. […] Business schools were to restructure their own doctoral programs by grounding 
students in the basic social science disciplines and direct their research toward more fundamental 
theory” (ibid., 20). 
Crucially for our story, Fourcade & Khurana argue that the fertilization was not unidirectional: 
while the new recruits brought the rigor of scientific methods to the teaching of would-be 
managers, the encounter with real world business problems affected, and sometimes re-directed, 
their own research agenda, with deep implications for the evolution of contemporary social 
science and, in particular, of post-1960s economics. As the authors put it, business schools have 
become increasingly intertwined with the progress of economics over the second half of the 20
th
 
century, “as both recipients and agents of scientific and intellectual change” (ibid., 30, emphasis 
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added).55 Of special import in this cross-fertilization was the Chicago Graduate School of Business 
(GSB), whose rapid ascendance in MBA rankings marked at the same time the triumph of 
mainstream price theory in business teaching and a major transformation in the subject matter 
and analytical orientations of neoclassical economics itself. While Fourcade & Khurana mention 
topics such as firm theory, principal/agent model, rational expectations theory and financial 
economics, I surmise that a similar argument may be constructed for Bayesian decision theory.  
The clues are indeed significant. All the three business schools the authors single out in their 
narrative, Carnegie, Chicago and Stanford, featured in the (rather short) list of early Bayesian 
strongholds in US statistics community. In particular, the dean of Chicago GSB was that Allen 
Wallis whom we already met as the first recipient of Captain Schuyler’s problem of sequential 
testing (see above, §1). Chicago was also the place where, at the recently founded Department of 
Statistics, “an amazing confluence of statisticians” materialized around Savage’s scholarship 
(Feinberg 2003, 16).  The list included faculty members Harry Roberts and David Wallace, graduate 
students Morris de Groot (who later helped establish Carnegie Department of Statistics) and Roy 
Radner, visiting scholars Dennis Lindley, Frederick Mosteller (later the first chair of Harvard 
Department of Statistics) and John Pratt (who also became a Harvard professor of statistics). Thus, 
there seems to be a substantial degree of overlap between Fourcade & Khurana’s story and the 
spread of Bayesian thinking in the US.  
Another clue comes from the events of statistical teaching at Harvard Business School. There, 
independently of Wald and Savage, Howard Raiffa and Robert Schlaifer developed their own 
version of Bayesian analysis. In a recent interview, Raiffa has told the story of his “almost religious 
conversion” to Bayesianism, after learning about the sure-thing-principle in Chernoff 1954 and 
understanding that “push[ing] the axiomatics […] it made sense to assign a prior probability 
distribution over the states of the problem and maximize expected utility” (see Raiffa interview in 
Feinberg 2008, 141). Note that Raiffa was neither a statistician nor an economist – he knew 
nothing about Savage and had never taken a course in economics – but his background in game 
theory and operations research made it natural to him to think of statistics in terms of decision 
problems. Hired in 1957 jointly by the newly established Harvard Department of Statistics and by 
Harvard Business School (HBS), he spent most of his time working in the latter. It was at HBS that 
Raiffa met Schlaifer, another accidental statistician who, trained as a historian but unexpectedly 
                                                 
55 That business schools have become formidable players within economic science is attested by the list of Nobel 
Prizes awarded to business school economists, seven of which were granted to GSIA scholars: see Fourcade & Khurana 
2011, 4, 21. 
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assigned to teaching basic statistics to HBS students, had quickly immersed himself in the 
frequentist literature, only to conclude that “standard statistical pedagogy did not address the 
main problem of a businessman: how to make decisions under uncertainty”. Thus, “he threw away 
the books and invented Bayesian decision theory from scratch” (Raiffa interview, in ibid., 143-4).56  
Both Schlaifer and Raiffa believed that frequentist inference methods were simply unsuited for 
making real business decisions: when a manager had to make a choice, traditional Fisher or 
Neyman/Pearson techniques were of little help, as she often had neither objective probabilities at 
her disposal nor the possibility to avail herself of a properly constructed sample. Yet, what she 
could do was to apply her experience to formulate an informed probabilistic belief and then 
exploit any further information to consistently revise her a priori belief. In short, Bayesian 
techniques looked like the most proper set of decision tools a manager could employ in her day-
to-day business. The striking similarity with Wald’s original intuition for tackling sequential testing 
problems (see above, §1) should not go unnoticed.  
Soon Raiffa and Schlaifer were to join forces and teach together an elective course in statistics 
at HBS. It was as a pedagogical move within this course that Raiffa transformed the game tree 
employed in extensive form games into his famous decision tree, where probability distributions, 
subjectively assessed by the decision-maker, are attached to chance nodes – a landmark tool for 
modern decision theory. And it was still in support of their shared course that the two published in 
1961 Applied Statistical Decision Theory (Raiffa & Schlaifer 1961). The book, which featured 
Raiffa’s decision tree as the prototype of statistical decision problems, was to become the main 
reference for the teaching of Bayesian decision theory in US business schools. In the mid-1960s, 
Schlaifer’s course became compulsory for the hundreds of HBS students in the Managerial 
Economics program. As Raiffa put it, that course was “like an existence theorem: it demonstrated 
that decision analysis was relevant and teachable to future managers” (Raiffa interview, in 
Feinberg 2008, 148). Even more relevant were two further initiatives launched by the duo. First, 
from 1961 to 1964 they ran the HBS Decision Under Uncertainty weekly seminar, which offered a 
stage for the presentation of advances in decision theory. The seminar was a real turning point in 
                                                 
56 The outcome of this dissatisfaction and reinvention was Schlaifer 1959, a book that was praised by Savage in the 
preface to the second edition of FS (see FS, v). In the Introduction, Schlaifer defined his book “a nonmathematical 
introduction to the logical analysis of practical business problems in which a decision must be reached under 
uncertainty. […] a really complete theory to guide the making of managerial decisions” (Schlaifer 1959, v-vi). The 
exposition was “based on the modern theory of utility and […] the ‘personal’ definition of probability. […] when the 
consequences of various possible courses of action depend on some unpredictable event, the practical way of 
choosing the ‘best’ act is to assign values to consequences and probabilities to events and then to select the act with 
the highest expected value.” (ibid., v, original emphasis). I reiterate the point that these words, which might as well be 
written in the FS, were put on paper by Schlaifer without any knowledge whatsoever of Savage’s theory.  
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that it testified that Raiffa and Schlaifer were starting to see themselves as fully-fledged decision 
theorists, rather than “just” statisticians. This new self-characterization of their own work 
enormously broadened the field for applying Bayesian analysis. Second, in 1960-61 Raiffa 
organized a 11-month program for 40 professors teaching in management schools who felt the 
need to learn more mathematics. The measure of the program’s success is given by the 
circumstance that future deans of Stanford, Harvard and Northwestern business schools were all 
graduates of the program. In it, Raiffa taught subjectivist statistics with a heavy decision theory 
orientation, thereby ensuring that “the gospel radiated outward in schools of management” 
(Raiffa interview, in ibid., 147). Remarkably, the program was financed by the Ford Foundation, 
that is, by the same patron which, by generously supporting both the GSIA and the GSB, as well as 
other important MBA programs, such as Stanford’s,57 favored the “scientization” revolution in US 
business schools narrated by Fourcade & Khurana.  
Summing up, we may say that Bayesianism was at least “in the air” in the Department of 
Statistics of places like Carnegie, Chicago and Stanford which also happened to host the leading 
business schools of the new, “scientific” kind. Harvard Business School may also be added to the 
list, thanks to the teaching of scholars like Raiffa, Schlaifer and, later, John Pratt. While of course 
the conjecture awaits further confirmation (say, by examining MBA curricula and reading lists, or 
by investigating personal relations between economists and Bayesian statisticians in those very 
universities), it may provisionally be concluded that the dramatic change underwent by 
management teaching in the second half of the 20
th
 century has probably played a major role in 
the spreading of Bayesianism in general, and of SEUT in particular, within contemporary 
economics. To reword Marschak’s dictum once again, it was not that homo economicus directly 
became a Bayesian statistician, but, possibly, that, first, homo managerialis was taught to behave 
that way, and, then, that economic agents came to be modeled as Bayesian corporate managers. 
                                                 
57 As far as Stanford is concerned, it may be added that Robert Wilson, the giant of contemporary game and decision 
theory who has been at Stanford Business School since 1964, learned his Bayesian skills under Raiffa at HBS. The list of 
Wilson’s students and colleagues at Stanford reads like a who’s who in the application of Bayesian methods to 
modern economics. See Giocoli 2009 for more details.  
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